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2Abstract
Using stochastic modelling, we demonstrate that the best investment strategy for the
accumulation phase of a defined contribution pension plan is one that limits the range of
returns that are credited to the plan member’s account.  In particular, we show that with-
profit accumulation programmes which make use of a smoothing fund to smooth out
returns over time dominate unit-linked accumulation programmes.  However, for the
decumulation phase, we show that it is hard in practice for an investment-linked
decumulation programme to beat the income and security provided by a standard annuity,
although we again find that with-profit decumulation programmes dominate unit-linked
decumulation programmes. Return smoothing is therefore a valuable feature of any long-
term investment programme both during the accumulation and decumulation phases and
this has important implications for the design of Sandler ‘stakeholder’ products.
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1  Introduction
The sponsors of a typical defined contribution (DC) pension plan will give the plan
member a large choice of funds in which to invest contributions, ranging from ‘low-risk’
money market funds, through ‘medium-risk’ managed funds, to ‘high-risk’ equities.
When the member retires and the decumulation phase begins, another wide range of
choices is usually offered. On the one hand, the plan member might be offered income
drawdown, whereby the accumulated assets remain fully invested, but an income is drawn
from the fund, subject to minimum and maximum distribution rules. On the other hand,
various types of life annuities might be offered, such as level, index-linked or investment-
linked1.
Is such a wide range of choices in the genuine interests of the plan member?  This paper
argues that it is not.  Most plan members are likely to be conservative investors when they
are young: they will be concerned about having a secure pension fund when they retire
and will not want to take risks.  This might lead them to invest in ‘low-risk’ funds for the
accumulation phase of their plan. We would argue that this is an act of ‘reckless
conservatism’. It would be much better for them to invest in equities during the
accumulation phase. This is because of the higher expected returns from investing in
equities in comparison with money market funds or bonds.  However, once retired, plan
members might be encouraged to be somewhat more adventurous with their accumulated
fund and take on a more aggressive investment posture than they did during the
accumulation phase.  This is more likely if they have other forms of secure retirement
income, such as a social security pension. We would regard this as an act of ‘reckless
adventurism’.
If the primary purposes of a pension plan are to provide an acceptable replacement ratio
in retirement at lowest cost and to eliminate the risk of outliving one’s resources, then we
will show that the best overall strategy is to do the precise opposite of what is indicated
above, namely to assume (some) risk when young in order to benefit from higher
expected returns during the accumulation phase and to limit the risk exposure during the
decumulation phase. We also show that that the ability to smooth out returns over both
the accumulation and decumulation phases by means of a smoothing fund is a very
valuable feature of a well-designed and integrated pension plan.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 derives a stochastic pension fund model.
Section 3 examines some key accumulation programmes, while section 4 investigates the
main decumulation programmes. Section 5 concludes.
42  A Stochastic Pension Fund Model
2.1  Theoretical model
Assume that there is a single risky asset whose return, r(t),  is generated  by  an
independent normal distribution2 with mean, µ , and variance, σ 2 .  Consider the
accumulation phase of a DC pension plan which begins with an initial investment A(0)
(which might be zero) and makes regular contributions of d per period. Returns are
continuously compounded so that at any time t, the value of the assets in the fund will be
lognormally distributed and determined by the following accumulation equation:
The first four non-central moments of the distribution of A(t) are given by:
since A(t-1),  d and  r(t) are all independent and where:
The initial values for these iterations are:
Variance, skewness and kurtosis at t are given by:
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5The value of the fund at t if it had been invested in a riskless asset with a constant return
rf  is denoted F(t) and is found using an equation similar to (1).
Eqn. (1) can also be used to determine the value of the remaining assets in the
decumulation phase of the plan which begins on the retirement date with a fund worth
A(0) and makes regular pension payments of d per period: in this case d < 0  in (1). The
relevant moments are also given by (2) and (8)-(10).
In some jurisdictions, the size of d is actuarially determined to ensure that the plan
member does not exhaust his fund before the end of his life:
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r tf0 00= =
∞
−∑  is the annuity factor at retirement age 0 and t p0 is the
survival probability between retirement date 0 and time t.
It is straightforward, though cumbersome, to show that the effect of an increase in asset
risk σ 2 (holding µ  constant) during the accumulation phase is to:
• raise E[A(t)]
• raise V[A(t)]
• raise S[A(t)]
• raise K[A(t)].
The effect of an increase in asset risk is therefore to raise both the expected value and also
to increase the right skewness and fatten the tails of the distribution. This means that the
distribution function of a fund invested in a high-risk asset (denoted D A z t H( ( ; , ))σ
2
below) will begin further to the left and so will initially be above that for a low-risk asset
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6remain below thereafter. This means that a high-risk portfolio can never stochastically
dominate3 a low-risk portfolio, since the following condition for (second-degree)
stochastic dominance will be violated for small x:
There therefore always remains a tradeoff between risk and expected return. This can be
illustrated using the commonly used investment strategy of cost averaging. During the
accumulation phase of an investment programme with regular contributions, the average
size of the terminal fund will be higher if the fund is invested in assets with a large
dispersion of returns than if it is invested in assets with a small dispersion of returns but
with the same expected return. This is because there is a higher probability of buying
assets at low prices and the increase in risk makes the terminal distribution of the fund
more right skewed.  At the same time, the tails of the distribution are fatter and this raises
the variance of the fund’s terminal value as well as the probability of both very low and
very high terminal values occuring. Risk-averse plan members will be concerned to
reduce the probability of low terminal values and this requires higher contribution rates
with high-variance investment strategies than with low-variance investment strategies.
During the decumulation phase of the programme, when a regular income has to be paid
from the fund, it is better to do this from assets with a low dispersion of returns than with
assets with a high dispersion even if the expected returns are the same. This is because
there is a bigger chance of having to sell assets at low prices and this may so deplete the
fund value that even subsequent high investment performance may not be sufficient to
compensate.
The best way of illustrating these results is through a specific example.
2.2  Parameterising the model
The following assumptions are used in the model below4.
• Increase in retail price index (RPI) 2.5% pa
• Pre-retirement investment returns in excess of RPI:
Mean  4.5% pa
Standard deviation5 15.94% pa
(up to last 5 years)
Standard deviation 12.3% pa
(last 5 years)
The standard deviation for most of the accumulation phase is consistent with the
historical standard deviation of the annual real returns on a portfolio allocated 60% to UK
equities and 40% to UK gilts6.  The standard deviation during the last 5 years is
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7consistent with the historical standard deviation of the annual real returns on a portfolio
allocated 100% to gilts. The standard deviations used have been chosen to correspond
with a ‘lifestyling’ investment strategy, whereby the investments are moved
systematically into lower volatility fixed-interest securities in the five years approaching
retirement7.
• Yield for purchasing annuity at retirement in excess of RPI:
Mean   3.5% pa
Standard deviation   0.63% pa
The standard deviation is consistent with the historical standard deviation of the real
redemption yield of a portfolio of long dated UK index-linked gilts8.
• Risk-free rate of interest in excess of RPI                        2% pa
• Earnings growth in excess of RPI 1.5% pa
• Promotional increases Nil
• Career breaks Nil
• Pre-retirement expenses 1% pa of the fund
• Pre-retirement mortality:
No assumption needed as               
benefit is assumed to be a
return of fund
• Post-retirement mortality:
Male annuity rates                                                                 PMA92 (B=1975)9
Female annuity rates                                                              PFA92  (B=1975)
Unisex annuity rates                                                              50%  of  PMA92 (B=1975)
                                                                                             + 50% of PFA92 (B=1975)10
• Profit loading on annuities                                               5%
The stochastically varying returns have been assumed to be drawn independently  from
normal distributions with the appropriate means and standard deviations (less fund
management charges of 1% during the pre-retirement period).  The analysis below is
based on 5000 Monte Carlo simulations.
3 Stochastic Modelling of the Accumulation Phase of a Pension Plan
For illustrative purposes, we have chosen to model a DC pension plan which aims to pay
a pension of £70 per week in 2000 prices.11
We assume an employee joins the plan in 2000 aged 25 and retires in 2040 aged 65.  We
make the following additional assumptions concerning the plan:
8• Contributions increase in line with earnings.
• No spouse’s pension.
• No other pension accrued to date.
• Target benefit of £70 per week in 2000 prices and wages.
• Benefit will increase in line with earnings pre-retirement.
• Benefit will increase in line with RPI post-retirement.
Table 3.1 presents projections of the annual contributions needed to meet the target
benefit under the assumption that expected returns are realised in full, so that the standard
deviation of returns is zero.  It shows that, on average, male contributions of  £930 per
year for 40 years are needed to generate a pension of £70 per week, although by 2040, this
will be equivalent to £127 per week in 2000 prices, since we are projecting that real
earnings grow by 1.5% per annum. Female contributions, as a result of the greater
longevity of women, average £1010 per annum or nearly 9% more than male
contributions. However if unisex rates are used then male contributions rise by £40 per
year and female contributions fall by the same amount. The pension can be met with
contributions equal to 4.7% of NAE.
Table 3.1  Deterministic projections of the required contributions
Type of annuity Contribution needed
to give an expected
benefit equal to the
target benefit (£ pa)
Proportion of
national average
earnings (%)
Male annuity rates 930 4.5
Female annuity rates 1010 4.9
Unisex annuity rates 970 4.7
In reality, of course, returns are stochastic and there is approximately a 50% chance of
failing to reach the target pension with the contributions given in Table 3.1.
In practice, the performance credited to the pension fund account will depend on the type
of accumulation programme chosen by the plan member.  We consider two main types:
• unit-linked accumulation programmes and
• with-profit accumulation programmes.
The former are offered principally by mutual funds (unit trusts, investment trusts and
open-ended investment companies), while the latter are offered exclusively by life offices.
93.1  Unit-linked accumulation programmes
Unit-linked programmes credit the full realised investment performance (however good
or bad) to the plan member’s account.  Table 3.2 shows that male contributions need to
increase by 71% to £1590 pa if a 75% chance of meeting or exceeding the target pension
is required and by 132% to £2160 pa if a 90% chance is required.  The corresponding
increases for women are 84% and 156% respectively. When investment returns and
annuity rates are stochastic, a higher level of contributions is needed if the target pension
is to be achieved with sufficient confidence. The table clearly shows the cost in terms of
additional contributions of reducing the risk of falling short of the target. A useful
analogy might be a high jump with a bar that moves randomly up and down. Much
greater effort needs to be made to clear the randomly moving bar than would be needed in
the case of a fixed bar, even if the moving bar has on average the same height as the fixed
bar.
Table 3.2   Stochastic projections of the required contributions with a unit-linked
accumulation programme
Contribution
to give 75%
probability
of exceeding
target
benefit (£
pa)
Proportion
of national
average
earnings (%)
Contribution
to give 90%
probability
of exceeding
target
benefit (£
pa)
Proportion
of national
average
earnings (%)
Male annuity rates 1590 7.6 2160 10.4
Female annuity rates 1860 8.9 2590 12.5
Unisex annuity rates 1730 8.3 2380 11.4
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the outcomes from the stochastic model in the case of
a unit-linked programme where contributions of £970 per year are made and unisex
annuity rates are used. This is the contribution amount needed on average to meet the
target benefit (see Table 3.1) and as expected leads to approximately 50% probability of
failing to meet the target pension of £127 per week. The range of outcomes varies from a
pension of below £40 per week to one exceeding £400 per week.
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Fig. 3.1   Cumulative distribution of the pension amount
in 2040 from a unit-linked accumulation programme
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3.2 With-profit accumulation programmes
With-profit programmes involve a declared bonus being added to the plan member’s
account. The declared bonus rates of any particular life office will depend on its own
policy towards distributing surplus and also its financial strength.  This means that a
general stochastic model of with-profit business is unlikely to be an exact guide to the
bonus experience of any particular life office.  However, in general, the life office will
declare bonuses based on ‘smoothed’ investment returns.  In the model used here all the
bonus rates quoted refer to bonuses in excess of inflation. We have assumed that the
anticipated bonus rate is 3.5% in real terms, the same as the expected return on assets net
of expenses.  However, we assume that the declared annual bonus rate will lie in a range
around the anticipated bonus range. We experimented with three ranges:
• 0 to +7%.  This means that the declared bonus rate will equal the realised real return
on the assets in the fund unless this is negative in which case a zero bonus rate will be
declared or the real return exceeds 7% in which case a bonus rate of 7% will be
declared. Returns in excess of 7% are placed in a ‘smoothing fund’ (which holds only
risk-free securities); this is used to make refunds to the life office when realised real
returns are negative.
• -2% to +6%. While the above symmetry in the declared bonus rate about 3.5%
matches the symmetry of the underlying returns distribution, it is likely to result in
higher average bonuses than would in practice be declared.  This is because the life
office uses the distribution of returns above the upper limit of the range to ‘pay for’
the distribution of returns below the lower limit.  In effect the plan member has a put
option which is exercised whenever realised returns fall below the lower limit and this
put option is ‘paid for’ in full by the plan member granting a call option to the life
office which is exercised whenever realised returns rise above the upper limit. It can
be shown (see Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2000)) that this zero-cost option strategy
(technically known as a ‘zero-cost collar’) is (approximately) symmetric about the
risk-free rate (not the expected return on the risky assets)12. We assume that the real
risk-free rate is 2%, so in this experiment, the range is 4 percentage points on either
side of this rate.
• -4% to +8%. In this experiment, we widen the range to 6 percentage points on either
side of the risk-free rate. Clearly, as the range extends out to ±∞ , we will approach
the limiting case of the unit-linked programme.
Table 3.3 shows the outcomes from these ranges in the case of unisex annuity rates with
the unit-linked programme listed for comparison. Compared with the deterministic case
where the contribution rate was £970 pa, the contribution rate rises to £1078 in the case
of bonuses in the range 0% ~ 7% if a 75% chance of exceeding the target is required and
£1179 if a 90% chance is desired.  However, for reasons given above, the life office is
unlikely to offer a range of returns that is symmetric around the expected return on the
fund.  It is more likely to offer a range that is symmetric around the risk-free rate.  With a
12
range –2% ~ 6%, the contribution rate rises to £1404 if a 75% chance of exceeding the
target is required and to £1539 if a 90% chance is desired.  Increasing the range to –4% ~
8% increases the contribution rate marginally.  Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 show the distribution of
the outcomes from the stochastic model in the case of the 0% ~ 7% and –4% ~ 8% with-
profit programmes where contributions of £970 per year are made and unisex annuity
rates are used. But the important point to note is that the contribution rate increases with
the range: the highest contribution rate occurs with the unit-linked programme.
Table 3.3   Stochastic projections of the required contributions with a with-profit
accumulation programme assuming unisex annuity rates
Contribution
to give 75%
probability
of exceeding
target
benefit (£
pa)
Proportion
of national
average
earnings (%)
Contribution
to give 90%
probability
of exceeding
target
benefit (£
pa)
Proportion
of national
average
earnings (%)
With-profit bonuses vary
between 0% and 7% in real
terms (symmetric around
expected investment
returns)
1078 5.2 1179 5.7
With-profit bonuses vary
between  –2% and 6% in
real terms (symmetric
around the risk-free rate)
1404 6.7 1539 7.4
With-profit fund vary
between  –4% and 8% in
real terms (symmetric
around the risk-free rate)
1458 7.0 1638 7.9
Unit-linked programme 1730 8.3 2380 11.4
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Fig. 3.2  Cumulative distribution of the pension amount in
2040 from a with-profit accumulation fund with returns
restricted to the range 0% ~ 7%
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Fig. 3.3 Cumulative distribution of the pension amount in 2040
from a with-profit accumulation fund with returns restricted to
the range –4% ~ 8%
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4  Stochastic Modelling of the Decumulation Phase of the Pension Plan
Most people retiring with DC pension plans in the UK choose level annuities, thereby
assuming inflation risk during retirement13. Similarly, if a 65-year old male annuitant
chooses an indexed annuity, he will receive an initial cash sum that is about 30% lower
than that from a level annuity, and, with inflation at 3% p.a., it  would take 11 years for
the indexed annuity to exceed the level annuity and 19 years before the total cash
payments are equalised.  Recently, a range of alternative vehicles have been introduced to
provide an income in retirement.  These alternatives are generally based on obtaining a
substantial investment exposure to equities.  A higher level of equity exposure will give
rise to a higher expected return and, inter alia, a higher expected income than a standard
annuity which provides an income related to the yield on bonds.  However, there is also
an increased risk and usually higher charges as well.
We consider five key alternatives to standard annuities:
• Income drawdown with an annuity purchased at age 75
• Income drawdown with a deferred annuity purchased at retirement age and coming
into effect at age 75
• Unit-linked annuity
• Flexible unit-linked annuity
• With-profit annuity.
The last three are the main examples of investment-linked annuities. In each case, the
projections are applied to a male retiring aged 65 in 2040.  For illustrative purposes
unisex annuity rates have been assumed. The individual concerned is assumed to have a
fund at retirement sufficient to purchase an RPI annuity that will be equal £70 per week in
2000 prices. We will examine the possible outcomes from each of the five alternatives at
age 75 with that which would have obtained had he purchased an RPI annuity at age 65.
4.1  Income drawdown with annuity purchased at age 75
In this case the fund remains fully invested when the individual retires at age 65 and an
income is withdrawn each year equal to that which would have obtained had he purchased
an annuity at age 65 (if there are sufficient assets in the fund).14  At age 75 he uses the full
remaining fund to purchase an annuity.15
Fig. 4.1 shows the cumulative distribution of the possible sizes of the annuity which
could be purchased at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would have been
receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The figures show
that the individual would be likely to do less well by taking the drawdown route, although
there is a 27% chance that he will do better than the annuity if investment performance
turns out to be strong.  There is almost a 10% probability that his funds would be
exhausted by age 75.
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An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 9.5% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting
drawdown having an income at 75 in excess of that which could be achieved by
purchasing an annuity at age 65.
4.2 Income drawdown with deferred annuity purchased at retirement age and
coming into effect at age 75
In this case the individual purchases a deferred annuity at age 65 which will provide an
income from age 75 equal to that which would be payable at that age from an immediate
annuity bought at age 65.  Having paid for the deferred annuity, the remaining fund is
fully invested and an income is withdrawn each year equal to that from an annuity
purchased at age 65 (if there are sufficient monies in the fund).  The individual’s income
is secure from age 75, but the fund may be exhausted before he reaches this age.
Fig. 4.2 shows the cumulative distribution of the value of the remaining fund at age 75 as
a proportion of his original fund at age 65.  If the value of the remaining fund is positive
at 75, the individual will be better off than he would have been had he simply purchased
an annuity at age 65.  The figure shows that there is a 65% chance that the funds will be
depleted before the age of 75, but this means that there will be a 35% chance of doing
better than the annuity.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 9.25% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a positive fund at age 75.
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Fig. 4.1 Cumulative distribution of drawdown with annuity
(Unisex aged 75 in 2050)
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Fig. 4.2 Cumulative distribution of surplus fund after deferred
annuity (Unisex aged 75 in 2050)
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4.3 Unit-linked annuity
In this case the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a unit-linked annuity at
age 65.  The fund is divided into a number of units depending on his life expectancy, and
each year some of the units are sold to provide an income the size of which depends on
the price received from the sale of the units.  It must be recognised that the initial income
payable to the individual will be less than that available from a non-linked annuity but
this sacrifice will be offset by faster income growth with the unit-linked annuity if
subsequent investment performance is strong.
Fig. 4.3 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the unit-
linked annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would have
received at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The figure shows
that the individual has a 65% chance of doing less well by taking out a unit-linked
annuity, although this implies that he has a 35% chance of doing better if investment
performance turns out to be strong.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 8.75% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he bought an
annuity at age 65.
4.4  Flexible unit-linked annuity
In this case, the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a flexible unit-linked
annuity at age 65.  Each year, he receives a payment from the fund equal to that available
from an annuity purchased at that time, where the annuity amount is calculated using an
interest rate based on the expected returns on the assets in the fund.  This type of annuity
therefore differs from a standard unit-linked annuity, since the payments to the individual
are recalculated each year and will depend both on the size of the fund and the prospects
for mortality at the time.  The annual payment includes a ‘survival bonus’ to the
individual to reflect the fact that he has survived for that year, whereas some other plan
member will have died during the year. This bonus acts to offset the mortality drag that
would otherwise be experienced.  This type of annuity is also less risky than a standard
unit-linked annuity from the provider’s point of view, since it deals automatically with
improvements over time in mortality.
Fig. 4.4 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the flexible
unit-linked annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would
have been receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The
figure shows that the individual has a 55% chance of doing less well by taking out a
20
Fig.  4.3 Cumulative distribution of unit-linked annuity
(Unisex aged 75 in 2050)
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Fig. 4.4 Cumulative distribution of flexible unit-linked annuity
(Unisex aged 75 in 2050)
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flexible unit-linked annuity, although there is a 45% chance of doing better if investment
performance is strong.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 7.50% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he bought an
annuity at age 65.
4.5  With-profit annuity
In this case the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a with-profit annuity at age
65.  The initial payment on the with-profit annuity is calculated using an anticipated
bonus rate. The subsequent annuity payments will rise or fall depending on the actual
bonus rates declared by the life office, in precisely the same manner as for the
accumulation stage.
Fig. 4.5 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the with-
profit annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would have
been receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The figure
shows that, as expected, the range of outcomes which might occur is smaller and less
skewed than would result from a unit-linked annuity. There is a 54% probability of doing
less well than with the annuity purchased at 65, but a corresponding 46% chance of doing
better.
An investment return on the underlying assets of approximately 4.25% pa in excess of
RPI and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting
this approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he
bought an annuity at age 65.
None of these alternatives to annuities generates an assured income by the age of 75 that
is higher than that from the annuity purchased at 65.   The probabilities of failing to do
are summarised in Table 4.1: they range from 73% for income drawdown to 54% for the
with-profit annuity. Corresponding to this, real returns (after charges) of between 9.50%
and 4.25% on the investments need to be generated before these alternatives to the
annuity dominate the annuity with a probability of 75%.
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Fig. 4.5 Cumulative distribution of with-profit annuity
(Unisex aged 75 in 2050)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Probability
0.71 0.75 0.79 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.16
Proportion of indexed annuity from age 65
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Table 4.1  The performance of the alternative vehicles to a standard
annuity for a male aged 75
Probability of
failing to do
as well as  the
annuity
purchased at
65 (%)
Probability of
failing to do
as well as
90% of the
annuity
purchased at
65 (%)
Real
investment
return (after
charges)
needed to give
a 75%
probability of
doing better
than the
annuity
purchased at
65 (%)
Income drawdown 73 68 9.50
Income drawdown with
deferred annuity
65 NA* 9.25
Unit-linked annuity 63 53 8.75
Flexible unit-linked annuity 55 48 7.50
With-profit annuity 54 17 4.25
* Guaranteed to match 100% of the annuity purchased at 65 by means of a
deferred annuity payable from age 75.
The with-profit annuity dominates the other investment-linked vehicles. The explanation
for this lies in the smoothed nature of the investment returns associated with with-profit
annuities. When investment performance is disastrous and the value of the fund falls by a
significant amount and assets still have to be sold to pay the pension, the remaining fund
can become so depleted that even with good subsequent performance it might not recover
sufficiently to maintain the pension in future years.16 This means that high returns can
never fully compensate for poor returns if the fund also has to pay an income stream
regardless of investment performance. Therefore what is needed to achieve (with a high
degree of probability) a higher pension with an equity-based investment than that from a
standard annuity (which is based on the return on bonds) is to have the extremes of
returns on the equity-based investment curtailed.  This is precisely what happens with a
with-profit annuity.  This is confirmed by the second column of Table 4.1 which shows
the probability of failing to do as well as 90% of the annuity purchased at 65: it is just
17% for the with-profit annuity and much higher for the other products.
The effect is the precise inverse of cost averaging during the accumulation stage of an
investment programme with regular contributions.  During accumulation, the average size
of the terminal fund will be higher if the fund is invested in assets with a high dispersion
of returns than if the fund is invested in assets with a low dispersion of returns but with
the same expected return. This is because there is a greater probability of buying assets at
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low prices. During the decumulation phase when a regular income has to be paid from the
fund, it is better to do this from assets with a low dispersion of returns than with assets
with a high dispersion even if the expected returns are the same. This is because there is a
bigger chance of having to sell assets at low prices.
5  Conclusion
We have demonstrated in this paper that taking (some smoothed) risk during the
accumulation phase of a DC pension plan can increase the expected terminal value of the
pension fund and hence raise the expected value of the pension in retirement. This is basis
of the simple investment strategy cost averaging.  However, the variance of the terminal
fund value is also raised and this raises the contribution rate into the plan if the plan
member wishes to limit the shortfall risk.  During the decumulation phase we showed that
the probability of investment-linked strategies outperforming a conventional life annuity
was fairly low. In both the accumulation and decumulation phases, however, with-profit
products that limit the credited distribution of returns dominate unit-linked products that
credit the full realised return.
These findings provide important guides to the good design of stakeholder pension plans.
They lead to the following implications:
• the decumulation phase is as critical as the accumulation phase, so a stakeholder
annuity product is essential component of a well-designed stakeholder pension plan,
contrary to the assertion in the HM Treasury – Department of Work & Pensions
consultation document “Proposed Product Specifications for Sandler ‘Stakeholder’
Products” (February 2003)
• during the accumulation phase, a with-profit–type investment strategy has a lower
cost of beating a target pension than a unit-linked–type investment strategy; however,
the stakeholder with-profit policy must have a considerably more transparent structure
than existing with-profit policies (which are obviously designed to have no
transparency at all)
• during the decumulation stage, the stakeholder decumulation product should probably
be a standard life annuity with a transparent management charge; if an investment-
linked decumulation product is also offered it should again be of the with-profit type.
Further, because of the mortality risk associated with offering life annuities, life
offices should be helped to hedge this risk by the government issuing ‘survivor
bonds’. These are life annuity bonds17 whose coupon payments decline at the same
rate as the population of  65-year olds on the issue date of the bond die out and so
would provide an excellent hedge for mortality risk (see Blake and Burrows (2001))
• there is no reason at all why unit-linked policies could not also have smoothing funds
attached to them in order to improve their suitability in stakeholder pension plans.
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 In some countries, such as the UK, it is a requirement to convert the pension fund into an annuity by a
certain age, currently 75 in the UK.
2 The assumption of independence is consistent with long-term mean reversion in asset prices: Poterba and
Summers (1988) and Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2001) find evidence for this in the US and UK respectively.
The assumption of long-term normality in asset returns is consistent with the central limit theorem: the fat
tails that are commonly observed in empirical asset return distributions may well be the result of the
smallness of the sample sizes used.
3 See, e.g., Ingersoll (1987, p. 123).
4 They are consistent with the assumptions required by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) for
projections made by providers of retail financial services products, with the exception of the return
dispersion assumptions about which the FSA is silent.
5 The standard deviation measures the dispersion of investment returns about the mean return. In a given
year, there is approximately a 1-in-6 chance that the actual investment return will be larger than one
standard deviation above the mean return, and approximately a 1-in-6 chance that the actual investment
return will be smaller than one standard deviation below the mean return.
6 Credit Suisse First Boston (2003).
7 While lifestyling would normally lead to a reduction in the expected return on the investments as well as in
their risk, we have chosen to maintain a constant expected return as required by PIA guidelines.
8 DataSTREAM.
9 PMA92 and PFA92 are standard tables of mortality which have been compiled by the Continuous
Mortality Investigation Bureau of the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries.  The tables refer to
males and females respectively.  The tables were derived from the mortality experience of life office
pensioners in the period 1991 to 1994.  The tables have been adjusted to allow for expected future
improvements in mortality.  The notation (B=1975) denotes that the version of the tables used is applicable
to individuals born in 1975.
10 This weighting anticipates the eventual convergence of male and female participation in the workforce.
11 This is equivalent to the pension achieved by someone retiring in 2000 on average earnings and a full
work record from the second-tier state pension scheme in the UK (i.e., the State Second Pension Scheme,
formally the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme). Employees are automatically members of this
pension plan unless they have been ‘contracted out’ into an eligible private sector plan. The objective of this
section is to design a pension plan that replicates the pension from the second-tier state pension scheme.
12 This implies that the policy above with a 0~7% range could not be offered ‘free’ to plan members, since
the put is worth more than the call; it could only be offered if the life office additionally charged an annual
fee of approximately 1.5%, the difference between the expected return on risky assets net of expenses and
the risk-free rate.
13 The costs and benefits of different types of annuity product are analysed in Blake (1999).
14 It is important for the sake of an exact comparison that the same income is withdrawn as with an annuity,
even though the income drawdown rules in the UK allow some flexibility over how much is withdrawn each
year.
15 Yaari (1965) and Fischer (1973) have shown that, under conditions of perfect capital markets and no
bequest motive by individuals, it is optimal for individuals to annuitise all their wealth in retirement.
However, Milevsky (1998) shows that it may be optimal to delay the purchase of an annuity and invest the
accumulated assets in higher-yielding (if also riskier) investments until it is no longer possible to beat the
mortality-adjusted rate of return from a life annuity (which increases with age as a result of mortality drag),
so long as a minimum consumption stream can be secured in the meantime; although, as Brugiavini (1993)
points out, the risk that an annuitant will live a very long time increases with the age at which he purchases
the annuity.
16 This is the problem faced by with-profit annuitants with the Equitable Life Assurance Society for example
(see Blake (2001, 2002)).
17 Annuity bonds pay coupon payments only: there is no return of principal. Life annuity bonds continue to
make coupon payments until a specified set of lives dies out.
